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Abstract—With the advent of blockchain technologies, the
idea of decentralized applications has gained traction. Smart
contracts permit the implementation of application logic to foster
distributed systems that are capable of removing intermediaries.
Hereby, lock in effects originating from isolated data storage and
central authorities are mitigated. Yet, smart contracts deployed
to a ledger generate dependencies on the underlying blockchain.
Over time, requirements regarding contract execution may de-
tach from the utilized chain due to contradicting incentives and
security or performance issues. To avoid a novel form of lock
in effect towards a host blockchain, we introduce a concept
for smart contract portability that permits any user to migrate
contract logic and state between blockchains in a flexible and
verifiable manner. As the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is
supported by a multitude of blockchain implementations, it poses
a common execution environment for smart contracts. We pro-
vide a toolbox that facilitates smart contract portability between
EVM-compatible blockchains without trust requirements in the
entity executing the migration process. To prove the concept’s
soundness, we transfer token contracts based on the ERC20
standard as well as applications containing dependencies to other
smart contracts. Our evaluation shows the validity of ported
applications including their current states.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Distributed Ledger Technology
(DLT), Smart Contract, Interoperability, Portability, Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM)
I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging blockchain technologies have leveraged a plethora
of distributed applications that do not rely on central instances
but are maintained in a decentralized fashion. While the Bit-
coin network, as proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 [1],
focuses on financial transactions independent from central
authorities, general purpose blockchains such as Ethereum
facilitate decentralization for a multitude of use cases [2]. To
achieve this, smart contracts are implemented for expressing
application-specific logic that is executed by all nodes par-
ticipating in the network. Hereby, third-party intermediaries
are obsolete, as the shared contract logic is reproducible and
transactions are cryptographically secure.
Applications utilizing smart contracts have evolved in vari-
ous domains such as supply chain management [3]–[5], social
networks [6], [7], identity management [8], [9] and energy
marketing [10]. With a growing amount of smart contracts
deployed to a single ledger, scalability becomes an increasing
concern. Furthermore, during a smart contract’s life cycle, re-
quirements may change. For instance, the application scenario
could shift from a public to a private environment or vice
versa. Similarly, the setting could require switching from a per-
missionless blockchain to a permissioned implementation. Due
to novel functionality or scalability, other blockchains may
better suit a given use case. Furthermore, blockchains host-
ing smart contracts may cease due to decreasing incentives,
security issues or centralization tendencies [11], mitigating
deployed applications’ survivabiltiy, as defined by Hardjono
et. al [12]. Several attack vectors have been proven to threaten
blockchains [13], [14]. In fact, incentives for maintaing a
blockchain do not necessarily conform with those of smart
contract users on the same chain [15]. This mismatch may lead
to the requirement of porting a smart contract to another chain
in order to mitigate involved security, availability or scalability
issues.
Similarly, attack vectors affecting secure contract execution
do not exclusively arise from underlying blockchains, but also
originate from faulty contract implementations. The exposure
multiplies when referenced libraries comprise vulnerabilities,
as happened in Parity’s multi-signature wallet implementation
in 2017 [16]. While referencing affected contracts in contract
clones1 could not recover locked cryptocurrency due to their
native characteristic in Ethereum, it can restore asset contracts
if users agree on a specific application replication.
Transferring smart contracts between blockchains requires
a common execution environment. While ledger implemen-
tations such as Neo2 provide their own platform for smart
contracts, the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) has been
adopted by a multitude of blockchains outside the Ethereum
universe such as Hyperledger Sawtooth3, Hyperledger Fabric4,
Hyperledger Burrow5, Quorum6, Qtum7 and Counterparty8.
Thereby, a smart contract written in a high level programming
language like Solidity and compiled to EVM-compatible byte-
code is deployable to any blockchain supporting the EVM.
In this paper, we propose a concept for verifiable smart
contract portability targeting EVM-compatible blockchains.
We present a tool that implements all required steps of
the migration process, namely execution code retrieval, state
1https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-1167.md
2http://docs.neo.org/en-us/sc/introduction.html#neovm
3https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/sawtooth
4https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-chaincode-evm
5https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/hyperledger-burrow
6https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/Quorum
7https://qtum.org/en
8https://counterparty.io/docs/faq-smartcontracts/
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reconstruction and generation of deploy-ready bytecode. Fur-
thermore, any blockchain participant is enabled to verify the
migration’s validity by comparing the roots of the original
and novel state Merkle trees. Therefore, no trust in the
executing party is required as both smart contract logic and
state are publicly verifiable. All transformations are performed
in bytecode. As a result, the contract’s high level source code is
not required for portability operations, enabling smart contract
forks that are independent from contract owners or primary
deploying instances.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Blockchains, Smart Contracts and the EVM
Blockchains provide an immutable peer-to-peer storage of
digitally signed transactions that permit, for instance, exchang-
ing assets without requiring any intermediaries. In addition to
simple transactions sending assets from one party to another,
Bitcoin supplies a scripting language for implementing addi-
tional functionality such as multi-signature transactions [17].
However, the scope of Bitcoin scripts is limited to very basic
procedures [18].
To overcome this limitation, Ethereum was proposed as an
alternative blockchain implementation that provides a quasi
Turing-complete virtual machine, the EVM [2]. Programs
written for the EVM, called smart contracts, are typically
developed using a high-level programming language such as
Solidity9 or Vyper10. These high-level contracts are then com-
piled to bytecode that is interpreted by the EVM. The resulting
program code consists of multiple components, as exemplified
in Figure 1. First, deployment-specific code is generated that
instructs the EVM to allocate memory, store contract code
and execute the constructor [19]. Second, the constructor
sets the initial state. Because it is only executed during the
contract’s deployment, its bytecode is not included in the
application logic, namely the contract code. Nevertheless, it
changes the contract instance’s state according to the declared
instructions. Third, functions implemented in Solidity permit
executing calculations, accessing the application’s storage and
triggering other internal or external procedures on the same
chain. Accordingly, functions are compiled to runtime code
by the Solidity compiler which is a subset of the deploy
code that is executed when deploying smart contracts to
the blockchain. While the EVM does not natively support
functions, referenced code can be called using the original
function’s signature which is defined as the first four bytes
of the method’s name and parameter hash [20]. Within the
deploy code, the EVM is instructed to copy the compiled
runtime code, it will therefore be part of an account in the
blockchain. The compiler also calculates storage locations for
each variable set. As the EVM uses key value mappings for
allocating variables in the storage tree, single variables are
numbered sequentially by the Solidity compiler. Values stored
in mappings and arrays are allocated according to their keys’
9https://github.com/ethereum/solidity
10https://github.com/ethereum/vyper
Smart Contract
constructor
functions
variables
events
set
set
emit
Deploy Code
preamble
constructor
Contract Code
Compilation
code copy instruction
1
2
3
Fig. 1. High level Solidity code is compiled to deployment code which is
embedded into a transaction
keccak256 hash. In addition to constructor and contract code,
a preamble is generated during the compilation process that
allocates memory and calls required deployment instructions.
Every operation in the EVM requires a specific amount
of gas for its execution [19]. Blockchains implementing the
EVM specify a gas limit for each block to determine an upper
bound of execution steps. In Ethereum, transaction senders
must include cryptocurrency in each transaction to bid for gas
that is needed for its execution. Hereby, a market is created for
the limited gas supply, leading to increasing gas prices with a
growing number of transactions.
Unlike Bitcoin, which relies on unspent transaction outputs
(UTXO) to facilitate asset transfers [1], [17], Ethereum follows
a state-based account structure. Two forms of accounts exist:
user accounts, also referred to as externally owned accounts
(EOA), and smart contracts. Each account maintains its own
state that is stored in a Merkle Patricia Tree (trie) for fast
and secure verifiability (cf. Section II-B). During contract
execution, not only the internal state may change, but also
external smart contracts deployed on the same chain can be
triggered. In addition, events can be emitted to trigger off-
chain processes such as user interface updates, or to provide
a different kind of storage that cannot be accessed from
smart contracts but save gas costs in contrast to state storage
operations [3]. Events are not stored by contract but are part
of the receipt Merkle tree that is attached to each block in
Ethereum. Therefore, to retrieve past events, nodes need to
iterate over all blocks from the most current block to the block
that holds the contract’s deployment transaction. To increase
efficiency, Ethereum utilizes bloom filters to check if a block
holds relevant events [19].
B. Merkle Trees
Bitcoin and Ethereum utilize Merkle trees for efficiently
verifying transactions and states respectively. Merkle trees
permit proving the inclusion of data in a tree of hashes without
requiring knowledge about the underlying data set [21]. In fact,
such proofs can be performed on pruned trees where only the
path from root to the target hash and child nodes at the first
level are included.
Ethereum relies on modified Merkle Patricia Trees which
permit efficiently persisting data in a map structure with
arbitrary length [2]. Data in the tree is encoded using the
recursive length prefix encoding (RLP) [19]. For efficient
traversal, three types of nodes are introduced: leaf, extension
and branch. As illustrated in Figure 2, each block in Ethereum
stores three distinct Merkle trees to save transactions, receipts
and state [22]. While branches comprise up to 16 references,
Figure 2 only depicts a subset for clarity reasons. The state trie
holds all accounts and contract data, with a dedicated Merkle
tree linked to each account, persisting maintained variables. In
the state trie, an account is identified by its address’s hash that
maps to an array of nonce, balance, storage root and code hash,
where the nonce indicates the account’s transaction count.
III. PORTABLE CONTRACTS
Migrating smart contracts between blockchains poses mul-
tiple requirements. First, both source and target chain need to
be able to interpret the given contract code. We have identified
a multitude of distributed ledgers implementing the EVM
which provides a common execution environment for such
applications. Second, the contract state in a given block of
the source chain should be maintained and transferred to the
target chain. Third, the correctness of the ported application
should be verifiable by third parties.
To facilitate smart contract forks and portability to
blockchains that are independent from the source chain, we
propose a migration process requiring multiple steps, as il-
lustrated in Figure 3. Therein, several entities interact with
the smart contract. Namely, Alice develops the contract in a
high level language such as Solidity, compiles it to bytecode
and deploys it to blockchain A. Thereafter, Bob executes a
setter function and modifies a state variable. In order to port
the contract to another blockchain, Carol retrieves the runtime
code and state. These components are used for constructing
deploycode that stores identical contract code on the target
blockchain and sets all state variables equivalent to the source
contract’s current state. Finally, while not being involved in
the migration process, Dave is enabled to verify the equality
of both execution code and state between source and target
chain by comparing their state trie hashes.
Migrating smart contracts from one blockchain to another
should not be restricted to contract owners or developers, as
they depict central entities, mitigating the original idea of dis-
tribution and independence of central authorities. To achieve
this target, all operations are conducted in bytecode, providing
flexibility and security, as the contract code is available to
every participant in the network and the transferred code will
be verifiably identical to the source contract. The deployed
contract code can be retrieved directly from Ethereum client
nodes such as geth or Parity. A migrated contract constitutes an
application fork since the original contract remains unaffected.
However, in case the migrating entity controls the source
contract, it may be destructed by its owner if intended.
To reconstruct the contract’s state, all contained variables
have to be observed from the ledger. Each smart contract
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Fig. 2. Each block in Ethereum holds three distinct Merkle trees for
transactions, states and receipts. Accounts may maintain discrete storage tries.
maintains a unique state tree holding all state variables. Fig-
ure 2 presents an example of the impact on the state tree when
modifying a single variable in a smart contract. Changing the
value associated with key 0x0 only affects its respective node
and referencing nodes while the remaining tree is unaffected.
The current state that is required for the contract’s migration
is highlighted in grey in Figure 2. In order to provide an
example of different kinds of variables available in Solidity
and to showcase how they are persisted in the state trie, we
implement a simple smart contract that is depicted in Listing 1.
While retrieving the variables directly from the Merkle tree
by accessing the node’s underlying key/value database would
be sufficient for single variables (cf. Listing 1, Line 4), as
keys are numbered sequentially by the Solidity compiler11,
this is not the case for mappings and arrays (cf. Listing 1,
Line 5) or bytecode that was created using different compilers.
To prevent Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that create Merkle
trees with maximum branch length, keys are hashed by the
EVM so that the resulting key for allocating the variable in
the Merkle tree cannot be easily manipulated [23]. Therefore,
when retrieving the keys from the Merkle tree directly to create
storage instructions, they would be hashed again during the
deployment, destroying the original mapping. By this means,
the information stored in the database is not sufficient for
restoring its state on a another blockchain.
11https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/miscellaneous.html#layout-of-
state-variables-in-storage
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Fig. 3. A smart contract is deployed and used on blockchain A. It’s state is reconstructed to create respective migration code for blockchain B. The ported
contract is verified by a third party that has not been involved in the migration process.
Ethereum node implementations such as geth12 and Parity13
provide a debug mode that permits replaying past transactions.
By this means, transactions are executed locally to record state
changes. State differentials do not only include affected values
but also their respective storage location in the state trie. A
prerequisite for debugging is a full node that does not perform
trie pruning, as the entire transaction history has to be avail-
able. To trace the outcome of transactions, the blockchain state
that existed before the transaction was mined is reconstructed
and the transaction is executed, providing the corresponding
outcome. As a result, all state changes can be observed,
providing information about the keys used in mappings as well
as single variables’ keys used to allocate it in the contract’s
key/value store. We utilize this mechanism to reconstruct the
smart contract’s current state. First, all transactions sent to
the smart contracts have to be discovered, including its initial
deployment transaction. To deploy contracts, the contract code
is included in a transaction that instructs the EVM to copy the
respective code to a new account. Information about deployed
contracts is provided in the transaction’s receipt. Transaction
receipts are stored in a unique Merkle tree referenced in each
block that has been mined. As receipts are stored indepen-
dently from the referenced account, all blockchain transaction
receipts have to be explored from the current block back to
the block that holds the deploying transaction in order to
examine if they are related to the target contract. Due to
the rapidly growing ledger size of the Ethereum main chain,
iterating over all transactions can be computationally intensive,
depending on the contract’s time of deployment. To permit
accessing all relevant transactions, we extract transaction data
into an external, structured data storage. Instead of querying
a blockchain node directly, the structured data is utilized
12https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/wiki/Management-
APIs#debug tracetransaction
13https://wiki.parity.io/JSONRPC-trace-module
for fast information retrieval. While maintaining an external
transaction database leads to significant performance improve-
ments, it is not mandatory for successfully migrating smart
contracts. Thereafter, all relevant transactions are fetched from
this database and replayed sequentially using an Ethereum
archive node to reconstruct the final state, as illustrated in
Figure 3. State changes resulting from transactions are stored
in a key/value store with the original key inplace instead of
the hashed key that is persisted in the Merkle tree. As the
transactions are replayed sequentially, we eventually obtain
the final contract variable state.
1 import "./ReferencedContract.sol";
2
3 contract SimpleContract {
4 uint256 a;
5 mapping (uint256 => uint256) b;
6 ReferencedContract referncedContr;
7
8 constructor(address _referncedContr) public {
9 a = 42;
10 b[13] = 21;
11 referncedContr = ReferencedContract(
_referncedContr);
12 }
13
14 function setA(uint256 _a) public {
15 a = _a;
16 }
17
18 function setB(uint256 key, uint256 val) public
{
19 b[key] = val;
20 }
21
22 function setRefVar(uint256 _var) public {
23 referncedContr.setVar(_var);
24 }
25 }
Listing 1. Example contract containing three different kinds of variables
A. Deployment strategies
After receiving the contract’s code and state, the deployment
instructions for applying the smart contract logic and state
to another chain is generated in bytecode. Depending on
the contract code and state size, we propose two distinct
deployment strategies. As a smart contract’s state tends to
grow over time due to an increasing amount of variables stored
in maps and arrays, storing the entire state during deployment
would exceed Ethereum’s gas limit. Therefore, the deploying
transaction has to be aligned with the gas limit within the
target chain.
1) Single Contract: In case the gas used for deploying
the contract code and executing all instructions required to
recover its state from the source chain are smaller than the
target chain’s gas limit, the migration is conducted within
a single transaction. For that purpose, we utilize the fact
that the constructor is, while being part of the deploy code,
excluded from the actual contract code that is persisted on the
blockchain, as illustrated in Figure 1. Therefore, we generate a
new constructor that recreates the source contract’s state from
our produced key/value map. To create respective deploy code,
first, a static preamble is applied to set the correct memory
pointer, as demonstrated in Algorithm 1, Line 2. Thereafter,
the storage instructions for each key/value pair observed from
the state are generated and appended to the bytecode (cf.
Algorithm 1, Lines 3-10). Here, both key and value are
pushed to the EVM’s stack before calling the SSTORE opcode.
Furthermore, the byte size has to be calculated in order to
select correct PUSH opcodes which range from 1 to 32 bytes
in the EVM [19]. To observe the respective opcode, we utilize
the fact that all PUSH instructions are represented sequentially
in bytecode, so that the length can be added to its lowest
operation, as presented in Algorithm 1, Lines 5 and 6. After
setting all variables, the contract code copy instructions have
to be generated. As the location of the contract code within
the deployment code is required, it has to be calculated with
regard to the constructor and contract code size, before adding
the corresponding bytecode. In the end, the contract code is
included as it was retrieved from the source chain.
Sending a transaction including the generated deploy code
to the target chain results in the creation of a new smart
contract that holds the identical contract code and state. The
equality of smart contracts can be verified by any user and
is not limited to the transferring entity. For verification, first,
both source and target contract are retrieved from the respec-
tive blockchain nodes and compared. Second, both contracts’
Merkle trees are retrieved from the nodes’ databases. In fact,
only the trees’ root hashes need to be compared to guarantee
the equality of both states. As a result, smart contracts can
be forked either on the same blockchain or between EVM-
compatible chains. Due to the facilitated verifiability, no trust
in the entity performing the transferring process is required.
2) Proxy Contract: In case the source contract or its state
are too large for deployment within a single transaction, the re-
construction process has to be split into multiple transactions.
Algorithm 1: Create Deploy Code
input : S− Set of state variable key/value pair
C− Contract Code
output: D− Deploy Code
1 begin
/* Add static preamble */
2 D ← 0x608060405234801561001057600080fd5b50
3 foreach s ∈ S do
4 lkey ← byteLength(skey)
5 lvalue ← byteLength(svalue)
6 D ← D . opcode(PUSH1) + lvalue − 1
7 D ← D . opcode(svalue)
8 D ← D . opcode(PUSH1) + lkey − 1
9 D ← D . opcode(skey)
10 D ← D . opcode(SSTORE)
11 lcode ← byteLength(C)
12 D ← D . opcode(PUSH1) + lcode
13 D ← D . lcode
14 D ← D . DUP1
15 D ← D . byteLength(D)
16 D ← D . CODECOPY
While adding a function to the original contract code would
permit iteratively setting the correct state using transactions
distributed over numerous blocks to avoid exceeding the gas
limit, such alteration mitigates the ported contract’s verifia-
bility. Therefore, three contracts are generated that perform
distinct tasks:
1) The logic contract contains the source contract code
without any alterations.
2) The proxy contract holds all variables and redirects all
method calls to the logic contract.
3) The initialization contract is authorized by the proxy
contract to set its state variables and destroyed when
the transfer operation is completed.
We utilize the EVM’s capability of calling a remote contract’s
function while operating on the calling contract’s state, by
using the delegatecall opcode [19]. Hereby, the deployed
contract code is only responsible for maintaining the source
contract’s logic but is independent from its state. Instead,
all state variables are managed within a proxy contract that
implements two functions: setting its state for porting the
source state and a fallback function that is executed every time
an unknown method is called. The first function is used to fa-
cilitate dividing the state recreation into multiple transactions.
As it is crucial from a security perspective that manipulating
the contract state is only permitted during an initialization
phase, we define an authorized contract responsible for this
task. Only transactions sent from this initialization contract
are accepted. After all variables have been set in the proxy
contract, the initialization contract is destroyed, so that it
cannot be used for future variable modifications. Through
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Fig. 4. Example of deployment and interaction process with a proxy contract
this mechanism, only the original contract state is part of
the proxy contract, ensuring verifiability by maintaining an
equal Merkle tree compared to the source state. Therefore,
the initialization contract’s address has to be hard coded into
the contract code in order to avoid alterations to the state.
The proxy contract’s fallback function is called every time the
calling method’s signature is not recognized by the EVM. It
forwards the method call to the logic contract including its
signature and parameters. While the logic contract executes
the initiated function, it operates on the proxy contract’s state.
The three distinct contracts should be deployed in the same
order as depicted in Figure 4 in order to embed correct
reference addresses. Bidirectional dependencies of proxy and
initialization contract either require the initialization contract
to maintain a respective state variable or the target address
to be precalculated. In the first case, a function in the
initialization contract permits setting the reference contract.
Instead, to decrease gas cost resulting from additional deploy
code and transactions, the referenced contract’s address can
be calculated by it the sender’s address and transaction nonce
(transaction count) [19]. The calculated address is set in the
contract’s bytecode, preventing the requirement for any further
setup.
After the contract migration is completed, users should
address the proxy contract which forwards the method call
to the logic contract, but provides the state that was ported
previously. The source contract remains unaffected from the
smart contract fork.
B. Dynamic Contract References
Smart contracts are not limited to isolated state variables,
but may refer to other contracts deployed to the same chain, as
exemplified in Listing 1, Line 6. These references are mutable
and can be adjusted on demand. Thus, the correct execution of
smart contracts also relies on associated contracts. To maintain
such connections during the migration process, first, references
are extracted by iterating over all state variables and checking
them for valid addresses. Thereafter, it is examined if the
addresses hold any contract code. If nothing is retrieved, we
assume the address refers to an externally owned account. Oth-
erwise, it depicts a smart contract that is migrated recursively.
By this means, not only the target contract is migrated, but
also all dependencies. Such referenced smart contracts can be
represented in a tree-like structure that depicts all required
migrations. As redeployed contracts retrieve new addresses,
respective references need to be updated accordingly in the
target contract.
Following historic migrations of referenced contracts, some
dependencies may have already been migrated to the target
chain. Depending on the use-case, it may be beneficial to either
redeploy the contract, for instance if the state has diverted
due to its utilization during a given time disparity, or maintain
the already deployed instance in case it is intended to rely
on its current state. To validate a migration process, it is not
sufficient to only approve the root contract, but also all related
contracts need to be considered. For this purpose, transparency
indicating if all related contracts have been redeployed during
migration or if it relies on other contract instances is required.
Replacing contract references in the state also modifies the
resulting state trie. Therefore, the correct state transfer cannot
be validated by comparing the state trie root hashes of source
and target contracts in this case. As a result, all values need to
be verified according to the claimed referenced contracts and
unaffected state variables.
C. Static Contract References
Despite dynamic references to smart contracts, addresses
may also be encoded in the contract code itself. Respective
addresses can either be declared directly in high-level code
such as Solidity or woven into the bytecode at compile time.
For instance, when utilizing a library, such contracts are mostly
constant, already deployed to the blockchain and do not change
over time. In order to create a link between the newly deployed
contract and the library instance, smart contract tools like
truffle14 permit specifying the library’s address during the
deployment process. It is then inserted into the bytecode
accordingly by the Solidity compiler. Similarly to dynamic
references, static links need to be migrated recursively to the
target chain in order to maintain existing contract connections.
To observe present static references, the bytecode is analyzed
for dependencies using the contract analysis toolbox Mythril15.
14https://github.com/trufflesuite/truffle
15https://github.com/ConsenSys/mythril-classic
After migrating all corresponding contracts, their source ad-
dresses are replaced with the newly retrieved target addresses.
As substituting addresses in the contract code leads to a
failure in validation when comparing source and target code,
a map of replaced addresses needs to be supplied. Using this
map, first, the correct deployment of contract code can be
validated. Second, all migrated contracts are checked recur-
sively based on the address map. Hereby, the target contract is
migrated including all relations in a transparent and verifiable
manner.
IV. EVALUATION
For evaluating the feasibility of the presented smart contract
portability concept, we provide a toolbox that provides all pro-
posed functionality. It contains multiple components targeting
each step during the migration process and is published under
an open source license on GitHub16.
All components that retrieve contract code or related trans-
actions and execute transactions utilize Ethereum nodes by
using the web317 library or direct JSON RPC queries. Methods
that target debug operations such as replaying transactions are
implemented specifically to a given client. Thus, they are not
included in web3, but have to be called explicitly. Currently,
Parity and geth as well as their forks such as Quorum are
supported. While the state is analyzed for observing possible
contract references within our implementation, we rely on the
security analysis tool Mythril for extracting static dependen-
cies. As the storage root of smart contracts cannot be retrieved
from the given node implementations immediately, we supply
a validation tool for underlying database implementations.
The key/value database LevelDB is accessed directly, as geth
utilizes it for storing chain data.
A. Token Contracts
As a major use-case for applications on Ethereum are token
contracts [24], we randomly choose a smart contract18 that
implements the ERC20 token standard19 to prove the presented
concept’s validity. A prerequisite for transaction tracing is an
archive node that does not perform any state trie pruning.
Therefore, we synchronize the Ethereum mainchain using the
Parity client. Retrieved contracts should then be ported to a
public testnet and a private, permissioned chain using several
node implementations.
For the selected contract, we observe 3,179 transactions that
have been sent to the given contract at block height 6,837,908,
including the deploying transaction. The reconstructed state
holds 759 key/value pairs. As storing a single variable requires
20,000 gas, storing all values in a single transaction would
exceed Ethereum’s block size limit of 8,000,000 gas. The
implemented toolbox automatically detects the needed gas
and utilizes a proxy contract to split the migration process
into multiple transactions. Finally, the state root of the proxy
16https://github.com/informartin/VeriSmart
17https://github.com/ethereum/web3.js/
18Contract address: 0x2A05d22DB079BC40C2f77a1d1fF703a56E631cc1
19https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20
contract is verifiably identical to the source contract. Hereby,
we could demonstrate the implementation’s applicability for
token contracts between multiple blockchains.
Every time the proxy contract is addressed after the migra-
tion, the call is forwarded to the logic contract. As a result, the
overhead of a delegate contract call is required, resulting in
additional gas costs of about 956 gas. Therefore, the costs
of deploying three smart contracts instead of a single one
and requiring additional gas for every method call result in
an inferior solution compared the prior migration approach.
However, it is applicable to any contract state size and the
additional gas demand is very limited when compared to
the costs of storing a single state variable taking 20,000 gas
alone [19].
While not intended, the logic contract could be called
immediately by any user, potentially changing its state. As
the trusted state maintained on the proxy contract remains
unaffected, such actions do not constitute a security threat
per se. Yet, malicious attackers could execute unchecked self
destructions if the logic contract exposes such instructions. As
a missing initialization could lead to failures in authorization
validation, the deployed contract code needs to be analyzed for
such vulnerabilities in advance using tools such as Manticore20
or Mythril. Such added security implications do not apply for
single contract migrations, as they remain initialized.
B. Contract Dependencies and Private Chains
We migrate the smart contract presented in Listing 1 to
showcase the migration of contracts containing dependencies
on other contracts. The application is first deployed to a
permissioned Ethereum chain using the geth client before
it is transferred to a local Quorum node. Executing the
migration process shows that all dependencies are resolved
recursively as expected. Yet, using Quorum as a target chain
reveals a limitation regarding verifiability. The Quroum client
supports private smart contracts which share their state only
between authorized nodes in the network. Private transactions
are brokered in a dedicated constellation network and stored
separately from the public state trie. While it is possible to
migrate contracts to Quorum in a private environment, the
current migration implementation cannot validate related state
variables. Though, we could prove smart contract verifiability
for public applications using Quorum.
V. RELATED WORK
Interactions between multiple systems are referred to as
interoperability. In the context of blockchains, numerous di-
mensions of interoperability exist.
First, it may refer to the blockchain as an enabler of inter-
operability between various software systems [25]. Here, the
distributed ledger provides a common ground for trusted data
exchange and logic execution beyond organizations [5]. As a
result, it facilitates process execution for collaborating entities,
20https://github.com/trailofbits/manticore/
independent of utilized software implementations [26]. Acces-
sibility and verifiability permit localizing potential implemen-
tation issues for liability purposes in distributed systems.
Second, assets such as tokens and cryptocurrencies may be
exchanged between different ledgers [27]. For instance, the
Interledger protocol facilitates payment processes and asset
exchanges between multiple ledger implementations without
requiring any intermediaries or trust in third parties [28]. By
locking funds in escrow contracts, assets are sent via payment
channels. Connector nodes depict interfaces to source and tar-
get ledgers. Following an incentive mechanism that distributes
some share of the transferred assets, connectors compete for
handling interledger payments. Transfers are either conducted
in an atomic operation including each involved entity and
backed by notaries or by utilizing economic incentives, en-
suring correct execution.
In contrast, Cosmos creates a network of a hub and multiple
zones, where each zone relates to a different ledger [29].
On the hub, being a distributed ledger itself, consensus
is facilitated by the Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant (BFT) Tender-
mint algorithm that is based on delegated Proof-of-Stake
(dPoS) [30]. Instead of routing assets over multiple hops, they
are transferred from one zone via the hub to another zone.
Similar to Cosmos, Polkadot enables interoperability between
multiple ledgers in a hub and spoke fashion, but additionally
shares security properties of underlying chains [31]. To achieve
this, blocks produced in connected chains are validated by
respective validator instances.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
While the implemented set of tools for migrating smart
contracts and verifying their validity could prove the con-
cept’s soundness, potential issues evolving from underlying
blockchain implementations remain. For instance, blockchains
utilizing Proof-of-Work (PoW) for finding consensus and
leader election suffer from absent finality guarantees [32]. As
a result, the state of a contract could be retrieved from a fork
of the blockchain that is not proceeded with due to inferior
cumulative PoW. While validations may succeed as long as
they are based on the source fork, the contracts’ actual state
could differ in such cases. Hereby, users assume a correct
contract migration while in fact the source state has not been
recorded in the origin ledger.
The presented concept follows the assumption that source
and target ledger share the same address pattern. Only in
this case, key pairs can be reused on the target chain to
claim assets, permissions and so forth. While substituting
addresses with those of the target chain could mitigate such
issues, it requires prior authentication of all affected users. In
general, this process would be comparable to claiming token
ownership on a newly deployed blockchain after participating
in an Initial Coin Offering (ICO). To achieve verifiability, this
process should be conducted on the source chain. Hereby,
account ownership can be ensured and information required
for validation purposes is available to all participants.
Like any account in Ethereum, smart contracts can hold
Ether, its native cryptocurrency. As an account’s balance is
directly stored as a value in the account (cf. Section II-B), it
does not affect the contract’s storage trie. Therefore, cryptocur-
rency held by a contract does not mitigate the validation of
transferred state variables. Yet, linked native currency cannot
be migrated to this point. To transfer such assets, notary
networks like Cosmos or Polkadot may be examined for
suitability in future implementations (cf. Section V).
In Ethereum, smart contracts can emit events for multiple
purposes. For instance, user interfaces may subscribe to events
for observing updates in order to display current information.
In other use cases, events are used as a cheap kind of storage,
as they require less gas in comparison to persisting information
by utilizing state variables [3]. While such data is only accessi-
ble externally, it may be crucial information depending on the
application. Currently, the presented concept does not consider
the migration of events. As events are bound to the block
in which the emitting transaction was mined, their migration
to another blockchain constitutes a task for future research.
In order to maintain associated information, both source and
target chain are required. Users should query the source chain
till the migration block and the target chain thereafter. In
future implementations, a middleware that forwards requests
to respective nodes could ease accessing smart contracts which
have been migrated during their life cycle.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a concept for facil-
itating smart contract portability between EVM-compatible
blockchains. Trust requirements in the migrating entity are
mitigated by providing verifiability of contract code and state
to any participant on the ledger. Depending on the source con-
tract’s size, two distinct concepts have been proposed, enabling
migrations of small contracts within a single transaction as
well as a set of three contracts to facilitate transferring large
contracts in a verifiable fashion.
To showcase the concept’s soundness, we presented a tool-
box that implements all components of the proposed migration
process. Respective contract runtime code is retrieved directly
from the source chain, while all transactions that have been
sent to the contract are re-executed locally to reconstruct
its current state. For applications that permit deploying the
fetched state in a single transaction, deploycode is generated
that stores the contract’s logic and initiates its state. Large con-
tract states are migrated using a dedicated storage contract that
is decoupled from its logic in order to maintain verifiability
after a migration phase.
We could prove the validity of migrated contracts by utiliz-
ing a ERC20 compliant smart contract as well as a sample
contract containing references to other contracts deployed
on the same chain. The evaluation of smart contracts using
multiple distinct blockchain clients provides evidence of the
proposed concept’s applicability.
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